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Derrida often insists that responsibility, if it is at all, must be
the experience and encounter of a certain impossible. I would
like in these pages to begin exploring this claim, first through
a reading of Heidegger's thought of responsibility, and then
by reflecting on Derrida's aporetics of ethics. It indeed ap-
pears that for both Heidegger and Derrida, responsibility is
not abollt a subject owning up to its actions (accountability or
imputability), hut rather has to do with the encounter with
al1d exposure to an event that proves lllappropriable. How
such an inappropriable-which Derrida would understand in
terms of what he calls the im-possible-precisely is what calls
for a response, and is thus the origin of responsihility, is what
I would like to show here: what I am responsible for is an
impossible. I will begin by identifying three moments of
inappropriability in Heidegger's thought of responsibility, be-
fore engaging Derrida's thought oE the im-possible as aporetic
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site of ethics. First, a few words on the sense of responsibility
in Heidegger's thought.
1. The Inappropriability of Responsibility
Thc f11:st point that indecd wc nccd to bear in mind in
any discussion on Heidegger and responsibility is that if there
is a notion of responsibility in his work, it will not be, and it
cannot be, act'ountabifi!J in the classical-modern, I<antian-
sense. Accountability, which has defmed the traditional con-
cept of responsibility, if not exhausted it, rests upon the no-
tions of agency, free will, and subjectivity: one is accountable
as a subject who is the cause of his or her actiol1s through the
freedom of the Will. Accountability, as a concept, thus as-
sumes the position of a subject-cause, an agent or an author
who can be displayed as a Jubjectum for its actions. Such is, for
instance, Kant's definition of accountability or imputation in
the f11:st Critique CA 448/B 476). Now we know that Heidegger
does not think the human being in terms of subject, and we
also know that he does not think freedom in terms of free
will. The basis for an identification of responsibility with ac-
countability thus seems to disappear in the thinking of Be-
ing-which does not mean that it does not harbor another
thougl1t of responsibility.
Indeed, at the same time that the cOl1cept of account-
ability is deconstructed, Heidegger consistendy maintams that
Dasein-a being who as we know is neither a subject nor an
ego, a consciousness, aperson, a rational animal, or even a
man-is to be thought in terms oE rcsponsibility. It in fact
defmes the very being of Dasein in at least three respects:
responsibility defines the essence of Dasein; it constitutes
seltbood; and finally, it defines humans' relationship to Being,
that is, their very essence. One could go as far as to say the
r::y concept of Dasem meanJ 'to_~~:_~~~~o_nsib~~ _of_and
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for oneself'. Heidegger says this explicitly, for instance in The
Basif ])roblems oJ' ])henomenology:1 "Only in. responsibility does
the self fltst reveal itself" (GA 24, 194). In the 1930 Sununer
Semester course (GA 31, 262), 01~ "The Essence of Hun~an
Freedom," he states that responsibility for oneself
(SelbstlJerant1JJortlitfJkeit) represents the very essence of the hu-
man being: "ReJponJibihO[y.!ör oneJe!fthen designates the funda-
mental modali!J of being which determines all comportment of
the human being, the specifit' and distinctit}e human action, ethical
praxis' (GA 31, 263). This "ethical" dimension of the con-
cept of Dasein appears early in .Being and Time, in fact, as early
as we are told that Dasein desigt~ates that entity for whom
Being is at issue. Dasein is that entity for which and in which
Being is at issue. In Jean-Luc Nancy's terms, existence is the
responsibility for existence.2 Being is given in such a way that
I have to take it over and be responsible for it. I am not myself
as if I 'had' myself in the sense of apossession or a predicate;
rather, I have being to be as my own, because such a being is
addressed to me as a possible way of Being, as a way to be,
and not as a "what." "To be": the being that I am is to be
taken over. This determinatiol~of Dasein from the outset
def1lles the self as a responsibility of itself. What else can the
expression of Care (Sorge) mean if not that primordial respon-
sibility of oneself that Dasein, as Zu-sein, is? For man, this is
the "ultimate demand," Heidegger explains in the 1929-30
course on The .Fundamental ConceptJ' ~f~ Metap~YJicJ: namely that
he "takes upon it again, explicidy and expressly, its own Dasein
and be responsible for it" (GA 29/30, 254).
We see from the outset that responsibility is not thought
as a consequence of a subject "cause" of bis or her actions,
hut is instead approached in terms of a response to an event
which is also a call, the call of Being. Such a call individuates
Dasein, constitutes its selfhood. Responsibility is not based
01~ subjectness, but constitutes the self as the called one. I am
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talled to be, and to make this Being my own: each tin1.e mine.3
Dasein can only be as called. Indeed, I do not posit myself
like a transcendental subject, but am called to be the being that
I am. Dasein has itself "announced" to itself, so to speak, by
the call of existence, as having-to-be in its two senses of fu-
ture and obligation. It is the call in the sense oE the temporal
rhythm of an "each time" wmch individuates the I: each time,
the I is thrown into existence, into existing; each time, Dasein
is delivered over to itself. This is why the call is also that which
I have to answer. There lies the hidden source and resource of
responsibility: to be responsible means, before anything else,
to respond, re-jpondere. "Having to be oneself": such is the
originary responsibility of Dasein. Heidegger also said "Be-
come what you are," a proposition that is not to be under-
stood ontically, as "Realize your potential!" but ontologically,
that is: what you are, you can only "become it," because
Dasein's being is to-be. In this "to-be" resides the ontological
sense of responsibility, and it is thus a responsibility that de-
fmes the self.
The response, we should stress, does not follow the call,
but is already given in the call, always already corresponding
to the Saying (Zusage) of Being. In fact, Dasein t:annot hut an-
swer it, it has eat'h time already answered, already said )es" to this call
of Being', it has alwqys-alreadygained act:ess to itse!! in such an answer.
To be responsible here means: to have been struck, always
already, by tms event. Heidegger writes in On the Wqy to Lan-
guage: "[The Saying's] vow is not empty. It has in fact already
struck its target-whom else but man? For man is man only
because he is granted the promise of language, because he is
needful to language, that he may speak it" (OWL, 90). Re-
sponsibility then refers to that event by which Being "enowns"
humans. It represents human beings' very belonging to Being,
as well as their essence as humans.
46
'l'HE POSSIBILI'lY OF 'l'HE LvI-POSSIBLE
Indeed, we could show that responsibility is striccly speak-
ing not a human responsibility but instead belongs to being it-
self, since, as Heidegger puts it, "in the determination of the
humanity of man as ek-sistence what is essential is not man
but Being" (B~ 237). Speaking of a human responsibility is
still within the anthropological enclosure of the concept of
responsibility: if it is the case that answerability breaks from a
subject-based thinking, breaks from the autonon1.OUS subject,
then b.ow far should this break take us? I would suggest that
responsibility names the co-belonging ofbeing and Dasein (a
co-belonging not posited by man but one il1to Wl1ich man is
thrown).
However, one notes that Heidegger reveals what I would
call instances of inappropriability at the heart of his analytic
of Dasein, which would seem to represent a veritable chal-
lenge to the very possibility of responsible agency, as they
oppose the traditional values and ideals of modernity, its model
of the absoluteness and transparency of subjectivity. Indeed,
they challenge the very pOJJibiliry of a free self-assumption of
subjectivity in responsibility, since it repreSel1.ts precisely not
only what I am not responsible for, b-nt also what I cannot in
principle appropriate. I will identify such limits-instances of
the impossible-by stressing three mon1.ents: the enigma of
moods; the question of birth; ontological guilt.
Moods
Whenever Heidegger describes moods in .Being and Time
(that is, mosdy in terms of thrownness), it is il1 order to em-
phasize the element of opacity and withdrawal that seems to
break and foreclose any possibility of appropriation. For ex-
ample, in the paragraph devoted to 'moods' and 'affective dis-
positions,' which exhibit Daseil1.'S being-throWl1., Heidegger
explail1.s that moods are beyond the reach of both will and
cognition. They are like the 'elugma,' he says, of Dasein's pure
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'that-it-is', i.e., Dasein's facticity. Fot instance, Heidegger states
that in being-in-a-mood, "Being has become manifest as a
burden." He then adds: "Why that should be, one does not
know" (SZ, 135). In fact, he continues, as to this "why," Dasein
"cannotknow anything of the sott" (ibid., my emphasis). Cog-
nition reaches "far too short." N ow this phenomenon is not
due to some weakness of our cognitive powers, whicll some-
how could be improved; ratller it has to do with the peculiar
phenomenon ofmoods as they exhibit the facticity ofDasein.
For in moods, which are a mode of disclosute, Dasein is said
to be able to "burst forth as a naked 'that it is and has to be'"
(ibid.).IV1oods disclose the Being of the there in its "tllat it is."
Heidegger states: '~ mood makes manifest 'how one is, and
how one is faring'. In this 'how one is', having a mood btings
Dasein to its 'there'" (ibid). And what is peculiar with this phe-
nomenon is that the "that it is" of our being is given in such a
way that "the 'whence' and the 'wither' remain in darknesI' (ibid,
my emphasis). This is why cognition falls short: in the phe-
nomenon of moods, there is this "remaining in darkness"
which is irreducible: it is, Heidegger says, a "characteristic of
Dasein's Being" (SZ, 135). Against this darkness, or opacity,
any enlightenment is powerless, whether theoretically or prac-
tically. Moods are "beyond the range of disclosure" of both
cognition and volition, beyond their possibilities of mastery.
This explains, by the way, why onIy a "counter-mood" can
master a mood, as Spinoza had already ciaimed. This indi-
cates that "against the phenonlenal facts of the case," a11 the
ideals of rational enlightenment "count for nothing," "for the
mood brings Dasein before the 'that-it-is' of its 'there', which,
as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma"
(SZ, 136). l\100ds thus reveal the opacity and inappropriability
\of our origins. In the course entitled "Introduction to Phi-
~osophy,"Heidegger claims that the fact "that by its own deei-
sion Dasein has nothing to search for in the direction of its
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origin, gives an essential prod to Dasein from the darkness of
its origin into the relative brightness of its potentiality-for-
Being. Dasein exists alwqys in an essential exposure 10 the darkness
and impotente ~f' itJ' origin, even ~f' onfy in the prevailing form of a
habitual deep.forgetting in theface of this eSJential determination of itJ
jatticiry" (GA 27, 340, myemphasis).
The Question of Birth
There is therefore a dimension in our being that resists
appropriation, whether practical or theoretical. That dimen-
sion is nothing other than our very coming into being, and the
sheer inappropriability of it. This, of course, mobilizes the
question of birth. It is often said, following Hannah Arendt,
that Heidegger has neglected the phenon1.enon of birth, that
he privileged being-towards-death. A word of caution here is
necessary. Notwithstal1ding the fact that thrownness is the
ontological name for birth (and that in the later work his re-
flection on phuJis can be seen as pertaining to birth under-
stood in a non-biological or naturalistic way), and that any
ruscussion of thrownness and facticity already include a re-
flection on birth, we should stress that the question of birth is
addressed explicidy in paragraph 72 of .Being and Time. Dasein
is said to exist between birth and death, not in the sense that
Dasein would occupy an actual place between two external
limits. Rather, Dasein exists as stretching itself between birth
and death, which means: Daseil1 is the between of birth and
death. Being that betweel1, Dasein exists towards each of them.
In other words, Dasein exists towards death, and Dasein exiJtJ
towards birth. This is why Heidegger speaks of a "Being-to-
wards-the-beginning" (Sein zum AnfaniJ (SZ, 373). Dasein is
said to exist "towards-the-end." But there are two ends: birth
and death. So principally, birth is an integral part of the exis-
tential analytic, and it is not entirely accurate to say that
Heidegger ignored this dimension. Further, the charge that
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he privileged death over birth rests upon a questionable philo-
sophical assumption, namely, f1!st, that birth and death are
somehow to be opposed as phenomena, and second that one
leaves birth "behind," so to speak, to only relate to death. But
Heidegger shows that in a sense birth and death should be
thOllght as part of the same phenomenon, or that at least they
are not to be opposed. And he also stresses that I am not
born once in order to leave that event behind so that I now
only exist towards-death; rather, the event of birth is happen-
ing each time as I exist stretching between birth and death, as
being-towards birth and towards death. I am thus each time
beginning, each time coming into being ane~ Heidegger ex-
plains that very clearly: "Understood existentially, birth is not
and never is something past in the sense of somethil1g no
longer present-at-hand; and death is just as far from having
the kind of Being of something still outstanding, not yet
present-at-hand but coming along" (SZ, 374). As beginning, I
am already dying. I exist as born, lexist as dying: the same
event. I am born into death. "Factica! Dasein exists as born;
and as born it is already dying, in the sense of Being-towards-
death" (ibid.). So Dasein exists as born, that is, "in a natal
manner" (gebürtig existieren), which immediately means, "always
already dying."
We thus exist both in a "natal" way and in a "morta!"
way, in the sense that we relate to both ends, "our" ends. But
are they really "ours"? In fact, they remain for Heidegger
inappropriable: I can no more go back behind my coming
into being than I can appropriate death by making it some-
how actllal. Facticity, understood as thrownness, reveals that
Dasein can never go back beyond this 'throw' to recapture its
being from the ground up. Dasein can never become master
of and appropriate its own ground and origins. As Heidegger
put it: '''Being-a-basis' means never to have power over one's
ownmost Being from the ground up" (SZ, 284). I am thrown
so
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into existence on the basis oE completely opaque (non)ground
which withdraws from all attempts at appropriation. It would
then seem that I am expropriated from my own being, thereby
rendering any meaningful sense of responsibility impossible.
And yet it seems as if respol1sibility happens in such a way,
Ollt of this very impossible. This, at least, is what apparent in
Heidegger's analyses of being-guilty and conscience.
Ontological Guilt
Does the inappropriability of moods, birth and death
indicate the radical expropriation of the human being, leading
to th.e failure and impossibility of responsibility as the capac-
ity to be properly one's own? We should not be too quick to
come to this conclusion, for the "inappropriable" might prove
to be the secret resource of appropriation, the secret resource
of responsibility. In "Inttoduction to Philosophy," Heidegger
thus explains that precisely that over which Dasein is not master
roust be "worked through" and "survived." He writes: '~lso
that which does not arise of one's own express decision, aJ
most thingsfor Dasein, must be in such or such a way retrievingly
appropriated, even if only in the modes of putting up with or
shirking something; that which for us is entirely not under the
controlof freedom in the narrow sense is something that is in
such or such a manner taken up or rejected in the how of Dasein
(GA 27, 337, my emphasis). Finitude and facticity are not ob-
jections to existence, they are instead its very constitution, and
our being-responsible, if it is at all, will have to be bot11 factical,
and finite. We should not attack existence (or the philosophers
who try to think it!), in order to make it conform to apre-set
norm of accountability and subject-based thinking; we should
instead drop the later in order to start thinking responsibility
phenon1enologically. It is therefore that sense of responsibil-
ity, i.e., as existential, finite, and factical, that needs to be brought
forth.
51
FRi\N<::OIS Ri\FFOUL
The inappropriable in existence as we saw in the phe-
nomena of moods, is primarily feIt as a weight or a burden.
What weighs is the inappropriabie. The being of the there,
Heidegger writes, "become[s] manifest as a burden" (SZ, 134).
But, interestingly, the very notions of weight and burden make
manifest, as it were, the problematic of respol1sibility. In a
marginal note added to this passage, Heidegger later clarified:
"Burden: what one has to carry; man is charged with the re-
sponsibility (überantwortet) of Dasein, delivered over to it
(übereignet)." Expropriation reveals a certain withdrawal in the
gift of being: Being withdraws in the very "throw" that brings
Dasein into existence. But it is this withdrawal itself that calls
Dasein, which summons it to be this being-thrown as its own
and be responsible for it. It is the withdrawal that calls, to be
and to think, and to be "responsible" for it.
What I have to make my own is thus what can never
belong to me, what evades me, what will always have escaped
me. Heidegger underscored trus incommensurability when he
claimed that: "The self, wruch as such has to lay the basis for
itself, can never get that basis into its power; andyet, as exiJting,
it must take over being-a-basis' (SZ, 284, myemphasis).
Thus, what I have to appropriate, ultimately, is the
inappropriable itself. I am not responsible, as Kant atgued,
because I am a subject as that wluch begins absolutely and
therefore as a subject to which actions can be assigned. Rather,
I am responsible because I am thrown in an existence that I
have to answer fot. So that to be thrown (faeticity) and to be
called (responsibility) are one and the same phenomenon-
hence the expression "Facticity of Responsibility" (SZ, 135).
Heidegger made that very point in his "Letter on Human-
ism." There, he explained that the phenomenon of thrownness
and that of the call of being are one. For it is from the call
(throw) of being that Dasein discovers itself to be thrown.
He writes: J\fan is "called (gerufen) by being itself into the pres-
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ervation of being's truth. The call (RuiJ comes as the throw
(Wu1) from which the thrownness (Geworftnhei~ of Da-sein
derives" (BW: 221f). Responsibility is then brought back to its
limit as to its most essential resource, if it is the case, as
Heidegger puts it, that "a limit is not that at which something
stops, bl.lt, as the Greeks recognized, the limit is that from
which something begins its presencing" (sein wesen beginnt) (pLT,
154, tr. slightly modified)." Th.e primordial sense of responsi-
bility would hence be: the appropriation of the inappropriable,
aJ inappropriable, having to answer a call that remains
inappropriable by some willful subject-and this is what
weighs. The weight, the assignation to a calI that precedes me,
the infinite task of owning up to it, all this indicates that onto-
logical responsibility implies the exposute to an irreducible
inappropriable othetness.
2. Responsibility and the Im-possible: Aporetic
Ethics
This, at least, is how Derrida reads responsibility: as ex-
posure to an incalculable alterity, an alterity that is said to be
"impossible" for the subject. In arecent text, an interview fot
the communist newspaper I'humaniti published on January 28,
2004, Jacques Derrida stresses the following points: When he
talks about ethics, he does not mean a system of rules, of
moral norms, and to that extent he readily concedes that he
does not propose an ethics. What interests him in ethics is
instead "the aporias of ethics, its limits," what he calls tl1e an-
ethical origins of ethics: not to point to the simple impossibil-
ity of ethics, but on the contrary to reveal the aporia as possi-
bility of ethics. As he puts it, it is a matter of making the
impossible possible, as impossible... In a sense Derrida's
thought of the impossible (which he writes as im-possible,
for reasons we will explain later) is a reflection on the para-
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doxical nature oE limits: both the end and secret resouree.
The limit (oE ethics) is the aporetie site of ethics. The im-
possible is possible and takes place as such. In fact, it will prove
to be the very structure oE the event.
For instance, he rethinks the possibility of ethical deci-
sion on the basis oE a "not-knowing." Already in A Taste Jor
the Set:ret, he maintained that "the moment of decision, and
thus the moment of responsibility, supposes a rupture with
knowledge, and thereEore an opening to the incalculable".4
He reiterates in the interview that the ethical moment "is in-
dependent from knowledge." When I have to decide, I do not
have the knowledge of the norm by whic11 to judge. There
lies for Derrida the very opening oE ethics: "It is when 'I do
not know the right rule' that the ethical question arises" (C'est
au moment du Je ne saispas quelle est ia bonne regie H que ia question
ithique se pose). This not-knowing marks the fltst appearance
of the impossible, here identified as the an-ethical origin of
the ethical, the an-ethical origin of ethics. The impossible rep-
resents a kind of inner alterity of ethics, its own resource other
than it. radically depropriated as it is made possible. This is the
paradox one must think. Derrida explains: "What I do is thus
both an-ethical and ethical. I question the impossible as possi-
bility ofeducs" [Ce queJejais eJt alors aUJ:ri bien an-ethique qu'ethique.
] 'interroge l'impoJjibiiite commepOJJibiiiti de l'ethiqueJ. The same logic
applies to Derrida's writings on hospitality, or forgiveness: for
instance, unconditional hospitality is impossible, in the realms
of politics and rig11t, and even in ethics traditionally conceived,
and yet this is what I must do. It is a matter, as the French say,
of "faire l'impossible," literally "doing the impossible" (for
instance, to be possible, forgiveness must forgive the unfor-
givable, and thus "do the impossible"). "Faire l'impossible" is
the condition of ethics for Derrida. "I try to think the possi-
bility oE the impossible."
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Passive Decision
Responsible decision Ca kind of "passive decision") is an
openness to the incalculable. This openness is an exposure to
limits that escape the calculability of the subject, being as they
are the markers of the inappropriable for the subject. Respon-
sibility is then understood as responsiveness to the opening
of the incalculable, an incalculable which remains
inappropriable for the subject. Derrida, as we saw, stresses
that a responsible decision can never be part of a calculable
horizon, that it cannot, for instance, consist in the application
of a rule, a determinable rule. A leap into the incalculable is
necessary for any decision to take place. Adecision can only
decide if the matter of the decision is not already settled.
Deciding without knowing, deciding without being able to
calculate all the consequences of tl1e decision. Here lies the
importance of the morif of the incalculable for Derrida's think-
ing of responsibility. It is a matter of marking an abyss-the
leap-at the heart of responsible decision.
In order to mark such heterogel1eity of responsibility to
the horizon of calculability of the subject, Derrida underlies
what he calls the "im-possibility" oE responsibility. Here im-
possibility does not mean that which cannot be, but rather
that which happens outside of the conditions of pOJJibility of
the egological subject, outside of the horizons of expectation
proposed by the subject, outside of transcendel1tal horizons
of calculability. "The incalculable happens."5 The impossible
is not what simply cannot be and is thus null and void. The
impossible, which Derrida writes as im-possible in order to
mark the excess with respect to the horizon of the conditions
of possibility of the subject, is the limit of subjectivity to which
subjectivity is exposed-exposed to the establishment of the
power of someone, some 'I can', "to all this I would oppose,
in the fust place, everything I placed earlier under the tide of
the im-possible, of what must remain (in a non-negative fash-
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ion) foreign to the order qj. my pOJJibilitieJ, to the order oE the 'I
can'."6 The im-possible is thus what lies outside the subject,
what exceeds it, and yet happens to such a subject, happening
to it as impossible.7
The impossible is also what opposes the neutralization
oE "the pure eventfulness oE the event" (pTT, 134). In fact,
an event as event is said to be im-possible in the following
sense: it happens outside of the horizon of preparedness of
the subject as 'I can'; it falls out of tl'le possibilities of wel-
come of the subject as host.H Derrida thus writes: '~n event
or an invention is possible only as im-possible."9 Further, this
impossible event-"there is the impossible" we are told (pTf,
120)-marks the alterity of the event, absolutely. Absolutely,
that is, abysmally and infinitely foreign to the 'I can': "This is
what I meant earlier by heteronomy, by a law come from the
other, by a responsibility and decision of the other-of the
other in me, an other greater and older than I am" (pTT, 134).
An abyss thus separates the possible from the im-pos-
sible. It is for that reason that Derrida speaks of the infmite
incalculability and absolute otherness of responsibility. Simi-
larly, when speaking of hospitality as welcome of the other,
Derrida shows that a conditional hospitality, one tl'lat remains
regulated by the pre-existing conditions oE a welcoming power,
is no hospitality. Tolerance, for instance, hospitality up to apoint,
is not hospitality: the other is here "welcomed" on the basis
of the conditions laid out by the host, that is, regulated by a
welcomingpower.H) One must therefore radicalize hospitality
to the point of a genuine welcome ofthe other, in the subjec-
tive genitive: the other arrives, in its own terms: "Whatever
happens happens, whoever comes, comes" (pTf, 129); hospi-
tality registers such an arrival. In contrast to conditional hos-
pitality-no hospitality but exercise of power by the hast over
the arriving other-Derrida proposes the notion of an un-
conditional absolute or pure hospitality, that is, a hospitality
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Inot relative to the apriori conditions of the subject, and there-
IEore absolute in that precise sense: "pure and unconditional
ihospitality, hospitality itse!f, opens or is in advance open to
someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whomever
arrives as an absolutely foreign viJitor, as a new arrival,
nonidentifiable and unforeseeable, in short wholly other (FIT,
29). Responsibility, as responsiveness to such arrival of the
other, is as weil incalculable, im-possible, and absolutely "oE
the other." Any theological turn here?
Or are we instead to understand these terms in their
phenomenological senses (a phenomenology of these plle-
nomena which exceed the horizon of fmite subjectivity)? For,
it is not so much a matter in Derrida's account oE an hyper-
bolic inflation towards a theological infinite, but rather of in-
scribing, at the heart and limit of the immanence oE experi-
ence, the transcendence of responsibility as responsiveness to
the other. This transcendence happens in immanence, and does
not constitute some theological beyond, because it is always
the interruption and (:onJtitution of a "here," drawing its con-
tours as it breaks it (dis-Ioeation, ex-appropriation). Derrida is
quite clear on this point: "This im-possible is not privative. It
is not the inaccessible, and it is not what I can llldefmitely
defer: it is announced to me, sweeps down upon me, precedes
me, and seizes me here now, in a nonvirtualizable way, in actual-
ity and not potentiality. This im-possible is thus not a regula-
tive idea or ideal. It is what is most undeniably real-like the
other. Like the irreducible and nonappropriable difference of
the other" (FIT, 134). The other is thus not beyond, hut here,
in a here that is marked by trauma and difference. There ij~
here and now, the impossible, he writes (FIT, 120). This sense
oE responsibility includes the ll1calculability of the open and
the actual situatedness of experience as constituted/inter-
rupted, ex-appropriated. As the passage we just cited indi-
cates, the excess of transcendence is the advent of a here
7
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(situatedness) as ex-appropriation. The impossible is the very
structure, and possibili!J, of the alterity of the event, and of
responsibility as welcome of (subjective genitive) such an event.
3. Ex-appropriation or Disaster?
A word of caution in closing: a subject always comes to
be-in responsibility-Erom the impossible as we described
it. Trus is the sense oE Derrida's writing oE "ex-appropria-
tion" in one word: the im-possible is possible, as im-possible.
Similarly, we saw how in Heidegger the inappropriability oE
birth and death constituted the very advent oE a ftnite selE
and even the possibility oE responsibility. And yet, could one
not object to this expropriated appropriation or ex-appropria-
tion-or perhaps better to this appropriated expropriation-
another sense oE the impossible, the one that ~fauriceBlanchot
designated as "disaster"?11 Blanchot speaks oE the disaster oE
the impossibility oE undergoing an experience in the sense of
a subject being able to synthesize, to make-present, to work
through and appropriate, a kind of passivity as exile from ex-
perience. In the experience of suffering, there is no "I" that
suffers: it is the place where the "I" ends. There lies what
Derrida also called the radical impossibility oE mourning, of
working through, thus oE appropriation and perhaps also of
ex-appropriation. The disaster is the radicalloss oE the pros-
pect oE salvation. The experience oE the impossibility oE ex-
perience is disaster. Experience is the experience oE limits, oE
what therefore remall1s inappropriable or "impossible" for the
subject (in the sense oE what I cannot da, or be). Would a
subject "in disaster" not mark the end oE ex-appropriation, its
radical disappearance, its eventual impossibility?
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